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Sub-Saharan Africa Report

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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

SCOPE OF AFRICAN NONALINEMENT DISCUSSED

Concept of Nonalignment

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 20 Aug-16 Sep 79 p 60

[Article by Omar Thiam]

[Text] "Following the Monrovia summit, the OAU entered a new revolutionary stage. This is perhaps one of the most significant results which could be noted at the close of the pan-African organization's proceedings. Let us hope that the sixth summit of nonaligned nations, to be held in Havana on 3 September, will also be the starting point for a stage of dynamism and revolutionary militancy ... "

These are the words which Seychelles President France Albert Rene used to express himself a few days after returning from Monrovia and the important discussions which he had, on the periphery of the OAU summit, with certain revolutionary and progressive African leaders. We know that in Monrovia, and then in Cotonou, private talks brought together the chiefs of state of Madagascar, Algeria, Benin, the Seychelles, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, the Congo, Sao Tome, Angola and Mozambique.

The hope expressed by the chief of state of the young Seychelles republic actually reflects the profound national aspirations of African peoples. Hasn't President Didier Ratsiraka told us time and again that to survive, develop and grow strong, the movement of nonaligned nations should break with the passivity, noncommitment and negative neutralism in which certain Third World leaders have always tried to confine it?

Shouldn't it be enlivened with a new breath of life which would take it back to the historic period when, from Cairo to Algiers, from Accra to Jakarta, from Havana to Conakry and Bamako, peoples who had just thrown off colonial and imperialist oppression had placed their trust in the principles and resolutions of the first summit of Third World countries?

If it is true that the problem posed by the racist and oppressive regimes of southern Africa disturb African chiefs of state--particularly those who, for

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reasons deriving from the reality of circumstances or Western ideology, would have liked to take a stand against wars of liberation--the very role of the movement of nonaligned nations also sharply divides the systems of government controlling the entire African continent.

Natural Allies

Two key issues are at the base of these differences: Is nonalignment to be conceived as a doctrine which seeks to establish a balance between the two military blocs dividing the world? And thus be mainly passive? Or is it to be a decisive instrument destined to effectively help peoples to throw off imperialist domination? The second question, to which Augusta Conchiglia replies (in the following article), is one of determining whether Third World peoples, in their daily fight, must learn to distinguish between their natural allies and their enemies.

The African in Dakar or Lome, in Abidjan or Lagos, in Ouagadougou or Kinshasa, does not hesitate at all. He knows that in order to become a "strike force," nonalignment must be active, militant, dynamic and committed to the anti-imperialist struggle. He also knows, regardless of his government's official position, that in any test of strength between African peoples and their colonizers of yesterday and today, socialist and progressive countries are his only natural, objective allies.

"It is necessary," the Malagasy chief of state has often said, "to know who our friends are and who are our enemies." Hasn't President Kerekou also said: "We need no lesson to know on whom we can rely internationally in the event of an attack on our sovereignty and independence."

And even very recently, Cape Verdian President Aristides Pereira, PAIGC general secretary, said that if any African country under attack must first rely on its own forces, the fact remains that it has the right, as the MPLA did, to appeal for internationalist assistance if its independence is endangered.

This approach is no doubt not shared by African chiefs of state who are loyal to their Western allies. This is no longer the approach of certain founders of the movement, who today refuse to make a distinction between the roles of the great powers.

But for African peoples in general, no doubt is possible from now on.

Friends, Enemies of Nonaligned Nations

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 20 Aug-16 Sep 79 pp 61, 62

[Article by Augusta Conchiglia]

[Text] Are socialist countries the natural allies of nonaligned countries? Or must the latter behave toward the former in the same way as they must behave toward the Western bloc?

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The question is not new, but since the latest summit at Colombo, differences among the movement's 88 members have become polarized over this consideration of a strategic nature and led to an impasse in June at the time of the meeting of the Coordination Bureau.

The view in favor of establishing privileged relations with socialist countries is supported by Cuba, as we know, as well as by progressive countries within the movement, but particularly by those which acquired their freedom and independence through an armed liberation struggle.

In southern Africa we cannot forget that the very existence of an Angola and a Mozambique, today independent and nonaligned, was possible thanks to the solidarity of socialist countries.

It is perfectly useless to wonder what kind of "nonalignment" the murderous puppets Savimbi and Holden would have preferred if they had been able to seize Luanda by using South African tanks.

"Socialist countries," President Samora Machel recalled at the special conference of nonaligned nations in Maputo, "have stood at our sides and have given us their political, diplomatic and military support in our armed struggles for national liberation. They provided decisive support for the armed struggle of the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau.

"At a critical time in Angola's destiny, they provided the means and support necessary to protect territorial integrity, the victories of the armed liberation struggle and to defeat the South African invasion. Socialist nations have been and remain our reliable rear guard on every occasion."

In Angola, the internationalist Cuban forces urgently summoned by the MPLA on the eve of independence are still there at the side of the Angolan Army, which is equipping and reinforcing itself. They defend the borders and discourage the South Africans from undertaking large-scale operations. It must not be forgotten that the occupation, for example, of the southern part of Angola, besides providing control of an important energy source (the Cunene dam), would enable Pretoria to annihilate SWAPO by cutting it off from its rear guard. That would make it possible for the South Africans to continue to occupy and exploit Namibia (behind the facade of a black puppet government) and to prevent that part of the continent from being a contagious example for others.

The Cuban internationalists in Angola still represent a force for regional balance, capable of restraining South African expansionism. This is certainly not the opinion of Pol Pot's emissary who, in Belgrade in December, unfortunately supported by a number of "nonaligned" countries, stooped so low as to describe the Cuban delegation as "mercenaries in the service of a superpower."

Yet even in the West, after 3 years of fanatical anti-Angolan propaganda, the sincere devotion of that people's republic and of its president, Agostinho Neto, to nonalignment has finally been established. And those who go there

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confirm that in Angola, as in Mozambique, domestic policy choices are dictated by the unshakable conviction of national leaders that only socialism can help them to emerge from the underdevelopment into which they have been cast.

"It is up to us Africans," Mozambique foreign affairs minister Joaquim Chissano told AFRIQUE-ASIE, "to learn how to retain our dignity, our character. It is normal that any country aiding another, regardless of which area, would be tempted to influence it and to reproduce therein its economic and political model ... We consider (countries which help us) to be our brothers, but we have told them that we had our own model. There is no question of our adopting the principles of others, regardless of who they are." "Noninterference in the affairs of others," one of the pillars of nonalignment, concerned and held the interest of the delegations at length during the latest preparatory conference in Colombo, particularly with regard to the question of Cambodia's representativeness, which was deferred until the Havana summit. This battle has made it possible for the most "moderate" nonaligned nations to acquire, within the movement, new positions which could contribute to relegating the struggle against the main enemy to a secondary position. Wouldn't this be an abandonment of nonalignment's reason for being?

According to the Mozambique president, the victories and flowering of the movement worldwide rest on two decisive factors: unity and a clear definition of the enemy. "Disappearance of the policy of blocs, for which we all hope and for which our movement is fighting, will be the result of our unity and the development of the anti-imperialist movement."

For southern Africa's independent nations, attacked daily by the armies of racist regimes, imperialism, which provides them with arms and supports them, is a very real and concrete enemy.

"Today, after the destruction of capitalist power and the establishment of socialist regimes in various parts of the world," President Machel stated, "the hegemony of imperialism has been broken and it can no longer invade, occupy and exploit our countries with the same impunity." "We have also grown," he also recalled, "because the movement of nonaligned nations has been able to find combat allies in the struggle against imperialism among other forces for peace and progress."

A Disturbing Sign

The Coordination Bureau's meeting in Colombo ended with a denunciation of the military and economic support granted to South Africa by eight countries, including the United States, France, Great Britain and the FRG, and with a reaffirmation of solidarity with the Patriotic Front and SWAPO. But if the next summit does not reach an agreement on the basic issues broached in Colombo, how will it be able to formulate a joint strategy against Pretoria and its accomplices? And the elimination, in Colombo, of the article which had been approved in Belgrade concerning eastern Timor's right to self-determination, representing a victory for colonial Indonesia, is a disturbing sign.

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Will the Havana summit expend all its efforts seeking a compromise to protect a facade of unity? Or will it choose another path? That of a militant, active and dynamic nonalignment which would concentrate its forces on opposing the main adversary: imperialism and Western neocolonialism and their loyal allies, whose number Beijing now appears to have joined. Then it would be an historic turning point that would mean a new formulation of nonalignment, in the interest of more effective protection for the peoples involved.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

KENYA EXPELS UGANDAN REFUGEES

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 10 Aug 79 p 2229

[Text] The Ugandan minister of foreign affairs, Mr Otema Halimadi, announced on 28 July that Uganda has issued a formal protest to the Kenyan Government following the expulsion of thousands of Ugandans from Kenya.

Mr Halimadi, quoted by Radio-Kampala, said that "the arrest by Kenya of thousands of Ugandans and their return to the border by trucks is a hard-hearted act."

The minister added that many of those expelled did not even have time to take along their belongings and that many children had been left in Kenya while their parents were taken back to their country.

Mr Halimadi ordered the Ugandan liaison officer in Nairobi (Uganda has no embassy in Kenya) to deliver the protest before returning to Kampala "for consultation."

Between 20 and 28 July, Kenyan police repatriated many Ugandans from Kenya, 2,400 according to informed sources in Nairobi.

According to the same sources, these were persons who had not normalized their situations with Kenyan immigration authorities. Many verification operations were launched following a crime wave, for which Ugandan nationals were partly held responsible.

Dr Henry Bwanbale, a member of the Ugandan Supreme National Council, who visited the border area between Uganda and Kenya at the end of July, also pointed out on 28 July in a statement to the government-controlled UGANDA TIMES that more than 25,000 Ugandan refugees living in Kenya had already been forcefully repatriated, sometimes under harsh conditions. These Ugandan refugees, some of whom had been living in Kenya for many years, are generally held in low esteem by President M. Daniel Arap Moi, who blames them for "ruining the Kenyan economy."

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

BOUMEDIENE-NETO PARALLEL--Houari Boumediene and Agostinho Neto: in October [1978], the former Algerian president had traveled to Moscow under complete secrecy. Officially, he was going on a "working" visit. In reality, this was a last chance trip. Boumediene died in Algiers on 27 December 1978. Eleven months later, the same scenario for Agostinho Neto. True, the Angolan president did not come back from Moscow, where he had officially traveled on a "friendship" visit. However, for the leaders of Luanda today as for those in Algeria yesterday, the guiding principle was secrecy. Do not diseases affecting chiefs of state concern their people as well? Nevertheless, today's Angolans, just like yesterday's Algerians, were kept in the dark. Rather than inform them, it was thought preferable to lie to them. [Excerpt] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 976, 19 Sep 79 p 35]

TANZANIAN-UGANDAN BARTER TRADE--A Boeing 747 aircraft chartered jointly by Tanzania and Uganda made in August a barter exchange totaling 2,730 tons of goods. Uganda thus supplied its partner with 1,365 tons of coffee and received in exchange an equivalent amount of various Tanzanian goods. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Sep 79 p 2522]

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CENTRAL AFRICAN EMPIRE

REGIME THOUGHT TO BE APPROACHING ITS END

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 29 Aug 79 pp 49-50

[Article by Jos-Blaise Alima: "And Now?" passages enclosed in slantlines published in italics]

[Text] Old allies stand aloof. Old supporters have packed their bags, others have gone underground.

The different protagonists in the Central African affair had, by a sort of tacit consensus, frozen their activities while waiting for publication of the report of the "verification mission." France and the African countries that had sponsored the establishment of the aforementioned mission attached special importance to the conclusions of the African jurists sent to Bangui. The Central African opposition itself repeated that the publication of the report would give the signal for a wide-scale offensive. His majesty's former prime minister, Ange Patasse, moreover, affirms having informed the French minister of cooperation, Robert Galley, of the imminence of a generalized popular insurrection in the event that Bokassa persisted in clinging to power. Both have now been served. The African jurists having done their work, it is now up to the politicians to assume their responsibilities.

The publication of the magistrates' report establishes a happy precedent in African political annals. But all this would be wasted effort if this "great premiere" were not followed up by concerted action on the part of all those concerned. France has already set the tone in announcing a decision that has its limits and its gaps: Paris has in fact decided on a partial suspension of its aid to the Central African Empire. In figures, the amount of the shortage to be reached would be about 100 million francs (5000 million CFA francs), which represent only a fifth of the total aid granted to the Bangui government. From this point of view, one could question the effectiveness of the French measures. Moreover, in dealing with Bokassa I, how can one make sure that money allocated to the fields of health, education and nutrition will not be used for other purposes? Unless it is a question of a warning shot by France, the decision is not of a nature to bring

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Emperor Bokassa to his knees. For it is now proven that Bokassa had clearly told the French that he was determined to cling by every means to his throne.

The last effort to dissuade him paid off in a smarting defeat for French diplomacy. Mr Rene Journiac, African affairs adviser at the Elysee, went to Franceville in Gabon on 1 August, to meet the Central African monarch there, together with the president of Gabon, Omar Bongo. The latter then had to spend an additional 24 hours in his native city, postponing an important meeting of his party's political committee planned for Libreville. But Emperor Bokassa put in a plea in bar to the suggestions of his interlocutors to yield his throne to a regency council.

As a matter of fact, if, as indicated by a survey carried out by JEUNE AFRIQUE, a large majority of Frenchmen and of Africans consider that France is responsible for keeping Bokassa in power, there also exists a fraction of French opinion hostile to the eviction of the monarch of Berengo. Already last January, President Giscard d'Estaing had confided to a chief of state of central Africa his fear of seeing the Central African Empire follow the example of its neighbor, the Congo, in swinging to the left in a central Africa increasingly menaced by destabilization.

Today it is LE FIGARO, whose links with French power are well known, which asks /"whether the strategy adopted of breaking off with the Empire might not lead to a worse situation."/ Bokassa's successor, it concludes, /"might be worse than Bokassa."/

One is thus tempted to say that the solution of the problem lies in Africa itself. The attitude of the African chiefs of state will be determinant in this respect. After having resisted pressures of all sorts and agreed to allow publication of the report on African soil, they have implicitly condemned their (former?) colleague. They are reversing their decision today by adopting a "neutral" attitude, capable of helping Bokassa to change course. One of them, the Senegalese Leopold Sedar Senghor, took the initiative a few weeks ago of recalling his ambassador to Bangui. That isolated action, like the French initiative, took place before the confirmation of the Bangui massacres. Today, now that no doubt is permitted, the moment of having scruples has passed.

Failure to act one way or another is to give proof with regard to the emperor of a solidarity which could only discredit the other African chiefs of state, whom some will end by identifying with Bokassa. The role attributed to General Mobutu at the time of the events in April would, under these conditions, be a false note in a concert which should

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be the work of all the African leaders. These must adopt a responsible attitude in order to avoid having Bokassa's dismissal be the work of France alone, which would then see to the installation in Bangui of a man capable of protecting its many interests. This is perhaps the time to test the will of the African countries, to give a concrete outline of the substance to be given to the Charter of Human Rights, the principle of which was decided on at the Monrovia summit last July. Why not, under these conditions, isolate Bokassa by a collective breaking off of diplomatic relations? Such a step would certainly contribute to weakening further an increasingly unstable throne.

Certain signs indicate that the appointment at Kigali of a "verification mission" was not a way of skirting the problem. Echoing the publication of the report, the African press is calling for the emperor's departure. Our sister publication LE SOLEIL of Dakar condemns "the bloodthirsty instincts of Bokassa I," whereas the LIBERIAN AGE calls on the emperor to abdicate. That the local authorities allow their official press to express itself in these terms reflects the general reprobation. But it is evident that the last word will come back to the people of the Central African Republic, who till now have not been able to express their deepest feelings.

Will the opposition abroad be able to suppress its divisions in order to seize this last chance offered to it? At this time, alternative solutions are not lacking. In Paris, for example, thought is still being given to that famous regency council which would be of benefit to the men on the inside, that is, to the last nucleus of the emperor's servants, regrouped around the prime minister, Henri Maidou. That idea having been rejected by Bokassa, there remains only the test of strength for which Antoine Bangui and Ange Patasse have been preparing themselves for 3 months. When will this be set in motion? Those concerned are sparing of their confidences. In the meantime, the imperial power is shrinking, day after day, like shagreen. One after another, his supporters are packing their bags and taking the road of exile. The former President David Dacko, for example, one of the "papabili," has just arrived in Paris accompanied by his family.

The emperor therefore counts first of all on support from abroad to resist as long as possible the combined pressures which are becoming increasingly sharp. In truth, only Libya can pride itself on still having a good press at the imperial court; moreover, Bokassa would have met Colonel Qadhafi at Tripoli both before and after his meeting with the Frenchman Rene Journiac. With the Soviet Union, the other conjectural ally, relations are far from being idyllic. The emperor did not hesitate to accuse the Soviets of being largely at the origin of the revolt which broke out in the country starting in January. How will the Kremlin react? Will it leave the exclusivity of this "dirty task" to Colonel Qadhafi?

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Whatever may come of it, Bokassa can at best benefit only from a respite. The countdown has begun, and the regime is living its last moments. The publication of the African jurists' report has just upset a certain established order in the customs solidly rooted in Africa. A breach has been opened in the sacrosanct principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of another country. Nothing will be the same as before. And we should be pleased.

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CHAD

KAMOUGUE BELIEVED TO HAVE BENEFITED MOST FROM LAGOS MEETING

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 5 Sep 79 pp 22-23

[Article by Jos-Blaise Alima: "One More Last Chance"]

[Text] Have they come at last to the light at the end of the tunnel? Not even the most optimistic yet dare to believe it. Nevertheless, the agreement reached by 11 Chadian factions on 21 August in Lagos could be a milestone in the country's unsettled history. For the first time, all the protagonists met around a conference table and agreed to participate in a transitional government of national unity. Such a government will have 18 months to set up permanent institutions. Its members will have to demonstrate a high sense of commitment in order to transcend their traditional divergencies and endow the country with viable, lasting structures.

Three of the nine points in the Lagos agreement give one an idea about the direction in which the country will be headed. First of all, there is the appointment of Goukouni Ouaddeimi and Wadal Abdelkader Kamougue to head the government.

The former has already held the task of heading the provisional State Council that resulted from the first Kano conference and he has always been considered as the most conciliatory of the protagonists. The fact that he should now be head of the government is therefore not surprising. However, this promotion is of undeniable political significance. It is an illustration of the compromise at which the Lagos conference arrived and of which the main beneficiary is Colonel Kamougue. Minister of foreign affairs when President Tombalbaye fell, Kamougue has been a tenacious defender of territorial integrity. He has therefore violently opposed the Libyan leaders, particularly at the 14th OAU summit conference in Libreville in 1976. His clashes with the head of Libyan diplomacy, Dr Triki, are famous. Excluded from the government following the agreement reached between General Malloum and Hissein Habre in August 1978, he headed the gendarmerie for several months. After the events in February, President Malloum entrusted Abdelkader Kamougue with the command of the Chadian Armed Forces (FAT). He still heads an important faction of the FAT in Moundou, where he had withdrawn. His appointment as vice president establishes the decline of his most relentless opponent,

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Hissein Habre, now sacrificed on the altar of national reconciliation. Actually, the conclusion of a viable agreement depended on a modus vivendi between the Habre-Goukouni team, which controlled Ndjama, and Kamougue, who had taken refuge in the south at the head of most of the country's upper-level personnel, protected by the Chadian Armed Forces. But while the former head of the gendarmerie had become the element indispensable to any coalition, it was also necessary to find a compromise man enjoying a sufficiently solid military base to serve as a counterbalance. Hissein Habre did not meet this requirement and furthermore, the other factions could not reasonably claim to play a prime role due to their degree of representation. It remains to be seen whether Habre will make do with second place, for he is a man who has never hidden his political ambitions. Will the fact that he is no longer in the forefront not cause him to go back underground, thereby placing the hard-won Lagos accord in jeopardy.

For his part, Kamougue appears to be the one who stands to win the most from the operation, all the more because the Lagos agreement demands the withdrawal of the French troops as soon as the government is formed. This is the second important point. It will be recalled that General Malloum and Kamougue had violently criticized France for the role played by its troops during the February events in Ndjama. At that time, they said that it was General Forest who had made it possible for Hissein Habre to stand up to the loyalist troops. The recent replacement of this officer at the head of the French troops may therefore have appeared to some as a disavowal. But the demand for the withdrawal of the French troops is a slap in the face of France, whose setbacks in Chad no longer count. It is true that as early as March, Paris had manifested its intention of withdrawing its troops from the country. But the government in Ndjama, labeled illegal by the other factions, had taken urgent steps to retain the French troops. It is certain that this French military presence prevented Kamougue's men from reaching Ndjama. Obeying the resolutions of Kano I demanding the demilitarization of the capital, a large share of the Chadian Armed Forces, loyal to Kamougue, decided to return to the billeting area set by the agreement -- that is, the south. This furthered his isolation at the head of the gendarmerie by the transitional government put in place by Goukouni and Habre, a government in which Kamougue had refused to participate. Henceforth, the rebellion in the south against the government in Ndjama created a de facto partition. The troops from the capital tried to put down this organized revolt, but the attempt of the government troops ended in failure. Not only were they driven back, but the southern front gained ground and came closer to Ndjama. On the eve of the Lagos conference, the southerners controlled five entire departments out of Chad's fourteen: Tangile, East Logone, West Logone, Mayo Kebi and Moyen-Chari. Kamougue's men even took it upon themselves to add part of Chari Baguirmi, of which Ndjama is the capital.

All things considered, nearly the entire southern region of the country was in the hands of the FAT. However, the new vice president was careful not to flaunt the fact. Only the presence of the French troops halted the advance of his men toward the capital. Actually, with precious human capital, a promising subsoil and nearly all of the agricultural resources,

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"useful Chad" has sufficient assets to tempt its leaders to secede. Moreover, they were accused of still wanting to do so. However, they issued a vigorous denial and in Monrovia at the beginning of July, Kamougue was specifically anxious to convince the African chiefs of state of his determination to preserve the unity of Chad. This constancy definitely had an effect in Lagos, where France was in the witness box, accused of having recommended the creation of a federation that had been rejected by all Chadian factions. And last but not least -- this is the third important point -- if the demilitarization of Ndjamena actually comes about, it will not hurt the FAT insofar as they had already withdrawn to the south. On the other hand, the dissolution of all the existing armed forces and the formation of one integrated force will pull the rug out from under those political leaders who based their positions on armed forces whose members were recruited from an essentially tribal base.

However, the problem of security was not thereby settled in Lagos. The principle of the establishment of an inter-African force was definitely underlined. Such a force would play a buffer role while awaiting the formation of an integrated army, made up of elements from the different factions. But while the neighboring countries were excluded from it, Benin, Guinea and the Congo were contacted and do not seem in any hurry to give their consent. Perhaps the appearance on the scene of the Organization of African Unity, whose secretary general was to ensure application of the ceasefire, will enable the OAU to take things in hand. It will also prevent certain neighboring countries from being tempted -- motivated by bitterness -- to intervene again in one way or another. Actually, from this standpoint, the prospect of a solution to the Chadian crisis is not to the liking of all bordering countries, beginning with those whose proteges have been excluded from leadership. It is mainly a question of Sudan and Libya, the respective "sponsors" of Hissein Habre and Acyl Ahmat. As for Nigeria, it can be satisfied because it was under its auspices that all the negotiations took place. General Obasanjo spared no efforts to achieve the agreement. The diplomatic action was accompanied by all kinds of pressure, particularly the oil embargo and the closing of the border. In truth, Hissein Habre and Goukouni could not hold out much longer. But can Libya be satisfied with what happened in Lagos? The fact is that its protege Acyl Ahmat will not play a front-ranking role in the government.

But the last minute alliance with Abdelkader Kamougue undoubtedly helped enormously to make the latter an indispensable interlocutor. Nevertheless, when the time comes, will the Libyans and Chadians be able to speak the same language? Furthermore, will the hasty departure of the French troops create conditions leading to an understanding of the different factions left to themselves before the establishment of a hypothetical "neutral force"? The answer is not at all certain and this is precisely the reason for the reservations of seasoned observers after the embraces in Lagos.

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EQUATORIAL GUINEA

SPAIN SAID TO HAVE BEEN INFORMED OF COUP IN ADVANCE

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 19 Aug 79 pp 40, 41

[Text] A military coup has overthrown the cruel dictatorship of Francisco Masie in Equatorial Guinea. In 11 years of government by terror, the tyrant destroyed the country and its people. Spain, which knew about the coup in advance, now is supporting the reconstruction process.

Spanish authorities knew about the situation in Equatorial Guinea 5 days before the coup d'etat which in the early hours from Friday to Saturday overthrew President Francisco Masie Nguema. This was reported by Jose Oneto, a special correspondent of CAMBIO 16, from Rio de Janeiro.

According to reliable sources, Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez and Foreign Affairs Minister Marcelino Oreja, had been informed that the deteriorating political situation in Guinea could end in the overthrow of Masie, who was isolated in his palace bunker, the most spectacular and luxurious in entire Africa.

Some 5 days before the coup d'etat, the Spanish embassy in Libreville sent the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Madrid a coded cable reporting that there were indications that possible important events could develop in the former Spanish colony. This secret and confidential information was based on the tighter security noted in certain official centers and, above all, on a certain unrest that could be detected in some sectors of the armed forces, firmly controlled by President Masie and which periodically underwent serious purges. After the first report arrived at the Santa Cruz Palace, officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs contacted the embassy in Douala (Gabon) [sic], which is the center of Guinean refugees.

Then 24 hours later, on Tuesday 31 July, reports from Douala confirmed that, as a matter of fact, important events could develop on the continent, and not on the island. As is known, the island that changed its name from Santa Isabel to President Masie Island, belongs to the Bubi minority, and because of repression carried out by Masie had been in constant confrontation with the dictator who belongs to the Fang ethnic group.

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Reports from Douala also indicated (reports that confirmed those supplied by the Spanish vice chancellor [sic] in Bata, the only official who remained in Guinea) that Lt Col Teodoro Obiang Nguema, a distant relative of the deposed president and in charge of the armed forces, had refused to discuss official matters with Masie. The dictator, who was on the continent, had expressed to Col Teodoro Nguema his wish to discuss some important matters apparently dealing with the situation created by a recent public employees' strike.

The information in Spanish hands was considered to be so important that Marcelino Oreja, who was at his El Escorial estate, decided to go to Madrid when the first reports started arriving.

Before the council of ministers, held on Friday 3 August, Suarez was fully briefed by Marcelino Oreja, and it was decided that a Spanish mission would be prepared to go to Guinea. Some 24 hours before the coup, at least two embassies (that of the United States and that of France) were informed of the situation by the Spanish authorities. The report was purely descriptive of what was going on, and apparently was supplied because no nation had reports of what was happening in a country that had practically no foreign ambassadors.

Spain has only one official there, because diplomatic relations have been broken since the last attack by Masie on King Juan Carlos, whom he publicly threatened in a speech "to tear out his heart," amidst the applause of hundreds of his listeners.

After the meeting of Suarez with Oreja (the council of ministers meeting on the 3rd received no information) the minister of foreign affairs contacted the director general for Africa, Pedro Lopez Aguirrebengoa, whom he ordered to be prepared to go to Bata at the opportune time. Suarez and Oreja received the report of the coup (which occurred at 0300 hours on Saturday) when they were already flying to Rio de Janeiro on the afternoon of Saturday, the 4th. Informed on the radio of the Spanish Air Force DC-8, which has a sophisticated communications system allowing direct radio contact with Moncloa [the residence of Spain's prime minister] and through the telegraph with the Marivent Palace in Palma de Mallorca, the King's residence, the Spanish mission was given the green light to go on to Guinea.

The same Saturday the mission, presided over by Pedro Lopez Aguirrebengoa, and including Mariano Uriarte and Sanchez Lara, went to Paris in order to arrive in Douala (Gabon) [sic] Saturday afternoon.

The first contacts by two of the members of the mission (Uriarte and Sanchez Lara) were made on Sunday, the 5th. After a short meeting with the Guinean strongman, Teodoro Obienga Nguema, it was decided that the director general of Africa would go to Bata the following day, Monday.

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The meeting of the mission from Madrid with the new Guinean president lasted over 2 hours, and was followed by a dinner, described in official circles as "very cordial."

During the meeting topics dealing with the development of Guinea were discussed. Guinea is a country sunk in misery and ruin by Masie, a dictator who does not have to take a back seat to the deposed Amin Dada of Uganda. Masie, who since his appointment was helped by the notorious Spaniard, Antonio Garcia Trevijano, author of the country's dictatorial Constitution, had become one of the most sanguinary tyrants of the world, and was practically isolated and without international relations.

From now on Spain has committed itself to help Guinea economically, to send technicians, food and, above all, medicines for a polio epidemic which appeared recently and is threatening to decimate a large portion of the young population of the country.

Last week two planes with medical aid left for the former Spanish colony. The mission is led by State Secretary Carlos Robles Piquer.

Finally, as to the Guinean situation, Prime Minister Suarez and Spanish authorities have denied any participation in a revolt which, sooner or later, was inevitable. Spain simply knew about it in advance and quickly took the appropriate political measures, which were to be of benefit to the Spanish role in Africa.

Since independence in 1968, after 190 years of Spanish colonial rule, Masie was the murderer of his own people and the destroyer of his country.

The figures are chilling: of 400,000 people living in Equatorial Guinea at the time of independence, one third survive, of whom 25,000 were slaves in forced labor regiments and 5,000 were dying in jails.

A relatively prosperous economy, of about \$250 per capita, was brought down to a level bordering on destitution: between \$50 and \$70 per capita at the present time.

Coffee production has decreased by one sixth, and the total cultivated land is one third of what was being worked at the time Masie came to power. The collapse of the economic system is such that while in 1967 some 667 merchant ships docked at the Guinean ports, last year only 10 ships dared to dock there.

Since he came to power Masie had devoted himself to consolidating a dictatorship based on terror. First, he purged the army, eliminated the two leaders, Ondo Edu and Atanasio Ndonga, dissolved political groups and created and established a single party.

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Mass murders forced the exodus of the population, while agrarian production units and firms with foreign personnel were destroyed by xenophobia unleashed by Masie. With his own army and the terror carried out by his own militia, the Juventud en Marcha con Macias [Youth on the March with Masie], the regime became institutionalized in a new Constitution which, in 1973, made the tyrant president for life.

By that time Masie held no less than 46 posts and gave himself a multitude of decorations and honorary titles: "The Only Miracle of Guinea," "Father of all Children," "Master of Education, Science, and Culture," and so on. His parents could be alluded to only as "saints," and by law any reference offensive to the president was punished by death.

Of course, these excesses could not have prevailed without the neglect shown first by the Spanish authorities and the support that Masie later found in some African countries and mainly the support given to him by the Soviet Union, China and Cuba, which even supplied soldiers for the personal escort of the tyrant. France also at all times maintained an ambiguous attitude, which allowed it to be the only European country represented in Guinea.

In the end Masie was left with one single person whom he could trust: his nephew and vice minister of defense, Lt Col Teodoro Obiang Nguema, one of the few officials of the regime who has always been in favor of an agreement with Spain. Apparently the action of Lieutenant Colonel Nguema in the attempt to land mercenaries in 1973, was decisive. According to the prestigious British yearly, AFRICA GUIDE, the military leader frustrated a coup d'etat against Masie in November 1977.

In opposition circles it is known that Lieutenant Colonel Obiang Nguema was obsessed by the idea that with the fall of Masie there would be a partition of Guinea: Fernando Poo Island, renamed with the name of the dictator, would go to Nigeria; the continental portion to Cameroon, and the south equatorial islands, to Gabon.

These circumstances, and a savage purge among his relatives in the praetorian guard, in which a brother of Obiang Nguema lost his life, seem to have precipitated the decision of the lieutenant colonel to put an end to Masie.

International support sought by Obiang Nguema in order to consolidate his purpose, in view of his attitude after the uprising, seems to be oriented toward France and Spain.

At the end of this week the dictator was resisting in his native village. It was a desperate act, doomed to failure.

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EQUATORIAL GUINEA

NUCLEUS OF NEW GOVERNMENT, POSSIBLE ORIENTATION NOTED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 5 Sep 79 pp 16-18

[Article by Pierre Gardel: "The Band of Ten Against the Ghost"]

[Text] It took an army and several days of hunting to get Macias Nguema Bigoyo Negue Ndone, former dictator of Equatorial Guinea. It would take a well-trained commando group only a few minutes to free him. The "model prison," the Bata jail, dates from the time of the Spaniards. Neither the prison nor the seven guards armed with Chinese machine guns give the impression that they would be able to resist an attack. If there is anything impressive here, it is Macias himself. His arm bandaged, still weakened by his escape through the forest, he still remains very much the tiger stalking his prey, even though it is he that is offered up to foreign visitors, and it is the guard assigned to hold him up long enough for a photo whose eyes are round with terror.

Macias Nguema still frightens people. No soldier wants to pose before the "ghost," the whitish silhouette who has replaced the portrait of the dictator on an airport wall. In Zang Ayong, the village from which he reigned, a single volunteer agrees to pose before another portrait whose head has been cut off with a bayonet, pretending to aim at this rather pitiful symbol. Everywhere, the Guineans ask foreigners whether they actually saw Macias wounded in prison. They call him "the beast," "the lion," or quite simply avoid naming him. They have trouble admitting that he is no longer invulnerable, this man who chose the lion from among the panoply of "protections" in force among the Fang, the man who stored up so much strength by taking the blood from others and finally, the man who also enjoyed the protection of the crocodile in the person of his wife Monica, who, unfortunately for him, went to North Korea for medical treatment.

Macias Nguema will be tried, perhaps in the presence of foreign observers. It is a dangerous precedent for all African chiefs of state guilty of violating human rights. But the Supreme Military Council (CMS), the new authority, scarcely has any choice. It must put an end to a myth. If there is a death sentence, the body will have to be put on display...and guarded. The beliefs of the Fang have far more weight than the pseudo scientific socialism which Macias Nguema wanted to utilize.

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The examining magistrate has already been chosen. He is a military man, a lieutenant whom the dictator placed under house arrest in his village. He is a member of the CMS and therefore belongs to the "clan" that dominates the council: the 1963-1965 class from the Spanish Military School in Saragossa. Not everything is yet known about this "band of ten." One of the members is definitely Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbazogo, the new strong man, nephew and vice minister of defense of the fallen dictator. With him was Maximiliano Mico Eyono, assassinated by Macias. The survivors are: Capt Salvador Ela Nseng and Capt Eulogio Oyo Riquesa, Lt Santiago Bee Ayetebe, Lt Celestino Mansogo Nsi, Lt Jose Moro Mba, Lt Cristino Seriche Bioco, Lt Moises Iyanga Malang and Lt Melanio Ebendeng. At the time of the coup d'etat, only Teodoro Obiang was free and powerful. All the others were already in jail or exiled in their villages. For some, it is even Teodoro Obiang who gradually excluded his former comrades. The fact that he freed them and brought them back into the CMS seems rather to point to a purge decided upon by Macias himself. In addition to this band of ten who were civilians before Spain gave them their training as noncommissioned officers, there are four "real" soldiers who went to Saragossa only for advanced training.

This is the core of the new government. The former Saragossa students head the CMS (Teodoro Obiang) and have one of the vice presidencies (Salvador Ella Nseng), the other going to Lt Comdr Florencio Maye, who conceived the Bata uprising. But the exact number of the members of the council or its technical junta is not even known. Only one thing is certain: They embody a return to the West after Macias' flirtation with the Chinese, North Koreans, Soviets and Cubans. Commissions will be set up to replace the former ministries and will sometimes have different names: The Foreign Affairs Commission will take the place of the Ministry of Friendship with the Peoples, the Justice Commission will replace the People's Ministry of Justice, and so on.

According to one of the council members, civilians will be placed in posts of responsibility, even on the CMS. This is reportedly the case of the former vice president, Nguema Essono. "If we do not give more precise information, it is because many things have not yet been decided. Qualified people are going to be put back into certain posts and we must make room for them."

In the meantime, Radio Malabo broadcasts its daily allotment of new decrees, all signed by Teodoro Obiang and ending with a vigorous "For a Better Guinea!" The new government believes that the restoration of freedoms has been accomplished and that it is now a question of rebuilding. On 21 August, a decree noted the negligence of citizens, especially on state or private farms. It called for an immediate return to work under penalty of severe sanctions. More than a revolution or a coup d'etat, it is a question of a "freedom coup," to use an expression of Nguema Essono.

It is true that there is a great deal to rebuild. At the time of its independence, Equatorial Guinea was a country of rich and prosperous plantations. Moreover, the Spanish had left a much more consistent heritage than the French in the rest of the region: roads and well-equipped cities.

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Malabo has retained its colonial charm, its well-laid-out roads, its shaded arcades and its highway to the airport. But the many shops are almost always empty. A tree has grown over the firetruck at the airfield. Only a few houses still have electricity. An entire district is bounded by a high wall that turned it into the dictator's private domain.

In Bata, once the pearl of Central Africa, the sea is the same, but there is not a single boat. Trees have grown over a luxury hotel whose construction was never finished (the crane is still in place). One still has to travel with food and drink or try to find a Chinese beer at 500 or 1,000 ekuele (1 ekuele is officially worth 4 CFA francs) and the black market -- which is four to five times more advantageous -- is just getting started. Foreigners passing through can store away memories: the hotels which open specially for them but which have not yet restored water and electricity; embassies turned into canteens for newsmen (except for the French Embassy); a surprising dance where there is nothing to drink. But the country will need time to emerge from the shadows into which Macias plunged it in the name of a caricature of Marxism that caused him to turn his bathroom into a national bank and store all the country's automobiles at his residence.

While the capital and necessary skills exist, it will still take at least 2 years to rehabilitate the cacao plantations that were once the finest in the world. Fishing reserves have been decimated and the fleet is nonexistent. Furthermore, the superfluous is perhaps coming about before the indispensable: Pepsi Cola is preparing to start up a plant again and Nigerian merchants for whom the high cost of living resembles good business are establishing themselves.

Macias Nguema will probably not be tried for his economic "crimes," even if the poverty they caused was as responsible for the massive exodus of Guineans as the political violence, for there are other cases that one has to mention: his older brother, who lives freely in Zang Ayong but whose house is said to be stuffed with ekuele (the Guinean currency); the ministers like the finance minister, who fled to Gabon before defecting to the new masters in Malabo. Macias Nguema must now be considered as the sole guilty party.

Arresting all the officials of the old regime would mean attacking the leaders once again. If Macias was not deposed sooner, it is because he was the lion, an invulnerable god. But it was mainly because those who had the strength to overthrow him -- and who did so -- were part and parcel of his regime. They needed time to decide to cut off the branch on which they were all seated. Malabo, the capital, became a dissident, openly and publicly, when Teodoro Obiang took refuge there. The last of the Saragossa band, he had learned that his uncle and president was beginning to distrust him and planned to eliminate him. The city of Bata followed suit on 3 August, when the vice president of the republic and Lt Comdr Maye Ela Mangue no longer had any choice: revolt or answer an obligatory summons -- always dangerous -- from the president.

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Except for Macias himself, it is time to forget. Less than 100 of his partisans are in prison in Bata, a dozen in Malabo. One can add those who died in the fighting and those executed on the spot. Less than 200 in Monte Bata, the scene of the first confrontations. From 400 to 1,000 dead (the two camps together) in Niefang, where one can still see a derelict tank, completely rusted. The figures are very small for a dictatorship that offered military resistance for 5 days. Thousands dead and tens of thousands in exile are also small figures for a dictatorship that lasted 11 years. There is talk of investigations to determine the degree of responsibility of some individuals, but everyone hastily forgives everyone "because they had no real power." Like the bank bills, the cars and canned goods, authority was concentrated in Macias' native village, in a palace that was scarcely more than a big villa.

This explanation does not seem adequate because the exiles have not begun to return, except for one of Macias' wives who fled to Gabon a few days ago with several suitcases full of money and who is now back at the Malabo palace... like in the good old days.

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EQUATORIAL GUINEA

BRIEFS

CUBANS FAVORABLE TO NEW LEADER--The Cubans do not seem displeased over the fall of their former protege, Macias Nguema. The Cuban press has commented at length on the events which have occurred in Equatorial Guinea, emphasizing the country's economic disarray and the climate of terror prevailing there. A few days after the coup d'etat, Havana newspapers even published a short but very flattering portrait of the new leader, Teodoro Nguema, who was presented as a "progressive military man." [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 5 Sep 79 p 26] 11,464

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KENYA

MINISTER DISCUSSES BUDGETARY DEFICIT FOR 1979-1980

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 24 Aug 79 p 2341

[Text] Presenting before Parliament on June 7 the budget of 1979-1980 for Kenya, due to start on 1 July and briefly summarized in issue of 15 June, p 1617, the vice president and finance minister, Mr Mwai Kibaki had first to paint a picture of the general economic situation of his country in 1978. This picture can be compared to the more detailed one we drew for the year 1977 with references to the preceding years (MTM of 3 and 7 Nov 1978).

In 1978, says Mr Kibaki, the proportion of agriculture, forestry and fishing in the GNP decreased notably in current prices and undoubtedly also somewhat in constant prices. However, although the rains were too heavy for a good coffee harvest, other crops and cattle breeding gave good returns. The boom in internal prices of consumer goods was exceeded by the fall in export prices, hence the total of sales for the sector decreased by 1.8 percent while on the contrary prices of goods imported by the sector increased by 7.5 percent.

Manufacturing made progress, but less than last year, mostly because of a slowing up of exports. The control of imports of raw material has not yet been appreciably felt in 1978. Wholesale and retail trade had a good year. Only a slight increase in the number of tourists from overseas was noted.

The replacement of East-African transport services by national services resulted in an amelioration of transports which can still be improved upon. The building industry was less active than could have been expected from 1977 and 1978 programs.

Profits made by Kenya on export sales of products refined at Mombasa did not balance the increased cost of imported petroleum products; their net price rose from L K 1.1 million in 1973 to L K 47.3 million in 1978.

The vice president and finance minister also noted that in 1978 export revenues declined by 21.1 percent and the import costs rose by 24.4 percent reaching L K 661.2 million. The balance of payments showed a deficit of L K 77.6 million at the end of 1978 while in 1977 it showed a surplus of L K 112.7 million. This deficit will continue in 1979 and 1980 [as published].

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Without taking into account the petroleum sector, the coffee boom stopped in 1978, therefore a fall in the GNP from 7.3 percent in 1977 to 5.7 percent in 1978. It is expected that the growth rate will not exceed 4 percent in constant prices, perhaps even 3 percent only.

Monetary policy during the last 2 years is reflected in domestic prices. In 1978 consumer prices in Nairobi increased by 13.7 percent, 8.1 percent and 8.3 percent for low, middle and high incomes compared to 21 percent, 13.5 percent and 14.5 percent respectively in 1977. Inflation rate therefore has been curbed. In an endeavor to diminish the balance of payment deficit the government has fixed appropriations in the 1979-1980 budget below the provisions of the development plan.

Coming to the budgetary data of the fiscal year 1979-1980, Mr Mwai Kibaki revealed that the budget will have a deficit of L K 66 million expenditures reaching L K 762 million and revenues L K 696 million only. But, he added, half of this deficit should be absorbed during the year by the tax increase on fuels, alcohols and tobacco and by the increase in import customs duties.

Ordinary expenses were fixed at L K 510 million including a provision of L K 86 million for the consolidated fund service and previous years reports; thus an increase of 6 percent over the fiscal year 1978-1979 which takes into account an increase of 4 to 5 percent in administrative personnel expenses, increase in personnel, in expenses for adult education, in free milk distribution to elementary school children, in expenses for census taking and general elections. The consolidated fund rises by L K 86 million because of refunds of commercial loans which have matured and which were necessary to insure the country's territorial integrity as indicated by the finance minister, warning that this pressure on public finances would be felt for some years to come.

Development appropriations were fixed at L K 252 million, including credit reports for the preceding year; this figure exceeds by 13 percent the expenditures the government would like to make do with effectively, even if it is inferior to the credits voted for 1978-1979.

As to the revenues the minister does not clearly specify those which come under the general heading and those which come under the heading of development. However, he indicates that L K 573 million will come from local resources and L K 123 million from foreign aid, that is L K 22 million in the form of credits, L K 67 million in the form of loans and L K 34 million in the form of amenities granted by the International Monetary Fund.

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MALI

BRIEFS

MILITARY PREPARATIONS--Mali is reinforcing its military capability, especially in the northern part of the country. This discreet operation was undertaken approximately 4 months ago. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 976, 19 Sep 79 p 39]

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SENEGAL

DATA ON FISCAL YEAR 1979-1980 BUDGET

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 24 Aug 79 pp 2328, 2329

[Text] The budget of Senegal for 1979-1980: 169 billion CFA(-5.3 percent)

The ordinance of 25 June 1979 acting as Finance Law for the fiscal year 1979-1980 (1 July to 30 June) fixed the overall budget of revenues and expenditures at 169 billion CFA against 178 billion CFA for the preceding year 1978-1979, that is a reduction of 5.3 percent.

The bulk of the budget in billion CFA is distributed as follows:

	1978-1979	1979-1980
Budget of running costs	103	106
Equipment budget	33	24
Special accounts of the Treasury	42	39
Total	178	169

The funds of the 1979-1980 budget have been allotted not in accordance with the estimates accepted on the establishment of the preceding budget, but in accordance with the perspectives revealed as the said budget was being implemented.

Thus the estimates of fiscal income do not exceed those in the preceding budget by more than 3 billion CFA; the running costs were decreased in comparison to the present administration.

Furthermore the budget for equipment is for the most part devoted to the cost of guarantees (9 billion CFA), necessary for the launching of loans by subvention to the autonomous Sinking Fund. The revenues of the said budget are this time guaranteed by secure loan resources.

Besides, the autonomous Sinking Fund from now on takes over the expenses of prefinancing and, on that account, benefits from a supplementary contribution of the general budget.

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The provisions of the 1979-1980 budget include the following revenues in billion CFA:

ORDINARY REVENUES	
Income taxes	1.9
Land taxes and other direct taxes	0.8
Importation custom duties	47
Exportation custom duties	5
Internal consumer tax	11.9
Transaction and production taxes	16.5
Registration and stamp taxes	4.6
Public property revenues	0.3
Service revenues	0.2
Miscellaneous revenues	0.5
Total	106

EXTRAORDINARY REVENUES	
Levy on equipment budget	1.5
Loans	15
Subvention of the Fund for price equalization and stabilization	7.5
Total	24

In the running costs the main endowments (in billion CFA) concern the following departments: National Education (17.9), Armed Forces (13.2), Interior (8.5), Foreign Affairs (7.7), Public Health (6.6), Higher Education (5.7), Economic Affairs (4.9), Equipment (4.2), Rural Development (3.1), Scientific and Technical Research (1.5), Housing (1.3), Youth and Sports (1), Waters and Forests (1) etc.

The equipment credits 1979-1980 are distributed in the following sectors, in billion CFA:

Financial investments	9.3
Social and community equipment	3.
Administrative equipment	1.9
Transport and telecommunication	1.4
Hydraulics	1.3
General studies	1.1
Agricultural production	0.5
Non-agricultural production	0.4
Reported and miscellaneous operations	3.1
Total	24

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Independently from the 24 billion CFA of the equipment budget special appropriation funds comprise 7.2 billion CFA of investment credits (local communities equipment funds, funds for housing and urban development and miscellaneous).

The finances law authorizes the borrowing, up to 15 billion CFA from foreign financial markets and international or foreign financial organizations, loans to be made in any kind of currency.

Also, on the internal market, the finance law authorizes issuing middle and short term loans in order to cover the Treasury expenses, using advances by the Central Bank of West African States and reconvertng guaranteed bonds subscribed to the Treasury by the said bank.

The endorsement ceiling provided by the state during the fiscal year 1979-1980 is fixed at 5 billion CFA.

The fiscal dispositions of the finance law affect the tax rate on fiscal duty and the importation custom duty (6 percent) as well as the tax rate for the tax on business turnover (6.6 percent).

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SENEGAL

DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED BY PAMIBLE OPERATION

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 24 Aug 79 p 2329

[Text] By a ministerial decree on 9 July 1979 the Senegalese Government promulgated the obligatory addition of millet flour in bread making (MMT of 20 July 1979, p 2041). This measure which intended to save foreign exchange for wheat imports seems to have run into difficulties in its application.

A study group entrusted with millet promotion under the presidency of Mr Assane Masson Diop, director of the Price Equalization and Stabilization Fund met on 8 August in order to examine the problems posed by the application of the Pamible operation.

This group includes among others representatives of ITA (Institute of Alimentary Technology); of ONCAD (National Office of Cooperation and Assistance for Development); of SANAS (Applied Alimentation and Nutrition Service of Senegal); of SONEP (National Society of Industrial Studies and Promotion) and of flour mills (Mills of Dakar, Sentenac Mills).

On the basis of economic control information, the group could ascertain that manufacturing standards had not been honored in all bakeries. Some cheated in the quantity of millet included in the Pamible: i.e., less than 15 percent of millet flour. Some bakers are even suspected to continue to bake bread exclusively of wheat.

SORES (Senegalese Catering Association) for example, continued to bake some considering that it was not affected by the new measure because it caters to nonnational customers.

It appears that a faulty interpretation of the ministerial decree is the main reason for the lack of application of the Pamible rulings. The state secretary of scientific and technical research is preparing an interpretation memorandum on the subject. Only sweet milk bread, chocolate bread, raisin bread and especially croissants are not subject to these measures.

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The Institute of Alimentary Technology expects some equipment which will make it possible to estimate the millet content of Pamible collected in bakeries. It will also be able to analyze the storage conditions of the flour in mills and bakeries. Thus, it will be possible to pin down responsibilities whenever the poor quality of a bread baked by a bakery has been ascertained.

The Pamible operation has the main objective to save foreign exchange for Senegal. In 1978 the country had to import 107.000 t of wheat, that is the exchange equivalent of 4.081 billions CFA. From this total 96.400 t of wheat are made into bread which represents roughly 3.654 billions CFA.

With the food deficit the total cost of cereal imports accounts for 50 percent of the Senegalese balance of trade deficit. The objective of the Fifth 4-Year Plan is the wiping out of this imbalance.

Thanks to diverse means of inducement to cereal production (i.e. price increase for the producer) millet harvests rose from 491.000 t at the end of the agricultural campaign 1977-1978 to 795.000 t for the year 1978-1979, that is an increase of 61.9 percent.

In the first place the goal will be to consumer 25.000 t of millet in the form of Pamible over the whole of the country.

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UGANDA

BRIEFS

PREPARATION FOR ELECTIONS--According to the Tanzanian Government newspaper DAILY NEWS, the chairman of the Advisory Council of the Ugandan National Liberation Front, Mr Edward Rugumayo, has announced that preparations for the general elections which are to take place in Uganda within 2 years will begin at the close of the year. Mr Rugumayo stated in particular that, within the scope of these preparations, a national census would be organized before the end of the year. He added that the United Nations has promised to help Uganda through its development program. Mr Rugumayo also stated that an electoral commission would be set up before the elections. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 10 Aug 79 p 2229] 11915

APPEAL TO POPULATION--The government has decided to intensify the police's armed night patrols even though reinforcements of Tanzanian police officers, in army uniforms, arrived in Kampala at the end of July to combat Kampala's prevailing crime wave. The current crime wave has led to murders such as those of two doctors from the Mulago hospital in less than 10 days' time, struck down by men dressed in military uniforms, and to cases of arson such as that which, according to Ugandan police, entirely destroyed a five-story office building in the center of Kampala on 27 July. In a speech broadcast on television and radio on 30 July, President Godfrey Binaisa appealed to the population to report to the police the presence of any person possessing or suspected of possessing stolen arms or military uniforms, announcing that a substantial reward would be given for any information leading to the arrest of one of these "criminals who terrorize, rob and kill innocent people." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 10 Aug 79 p 2229] 11915

MISSION TO EAST BERLIN--A Ugandan "good will mission" led by Mr Ateker Ejalu, a member of the Executive Council of the Ugandan National Liberation Front and minister for regional cooperation, was received in East Berlin on 29 July by Mr Horst Sindermann, deputy chairman of the GDR State Council. The talks, which were held in an "open and candid" atmosphere according to GDR official circles, concerned the situation in Europe and in Africa, as well as Ugandan-GDR bilateral relations. Mr Ejalu also conveyed to Mr Sindermann a message from Ugandan President Godfrey Binaisa addressed to Mr Erich Honecker, chief of state and of the GDR PC [Communist Party]. During his visit to the GDR, Mr Ejalu also met with Mr Gerhard Weiss, deputy chairman of the council, and with Mr Herbert Krolikowski, deputy minister for foreign affairs. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 10 Aug 79 p 2229] 11915

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ZAIRE

BRIEFS

DIAMOND MINING--Miniere de Bakwanga (MIBA), a Zairian diamond mining company, produced 10.6 million carats in 1978 (as opposed to 10.8 million in 1977), according to the company's annual report. The company thus made a profit of 10.8 million zaires (27 million French francs) in comparison to a loss of 851 zaires the previous year, due to a significant increase in the price of diamonds (about 30 percent) on the world market. The report also states that 1978 was mainly devoted to diamond prospecting, operations for installing a new washing plant and conversion of electric separators. MIBA, which operates in Kasai (in central Zaire), has been in partnership since May 1978 with SIBEKA (a Belgian-English company), which holds 20 percent of the stock; the Zairian Government holds the remaining 80 percent. Zaire is currently the world's largest producer of diamonds. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 10 Aug 79 p 2228] 11915

COBALT PRODUCTION--The Zairian mining industry produced 13,095 t [tons] of cobalt in 1978 as opposed to 10,208 t in 1977 and 13,644 t in 1975, the Zairian state commissioner for national economy, industry and trade stated on 6 August. Ore production, on the increase for 2 years, had been suspended in 1976 following the closing of the Benguela railroad linking the Shaba mining region with the Angolan port of Lobito on the Atlantic Ocean. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 10 Aug 79 p 2228] 11915

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